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Abstract. Insider threat is becoming comparable to outsider threat in
frequency of security events. This is a worrying situation, since insider at-
tacks have a high probability of success because insiders have authorized
access and legitimate privileges. Despite their importance, insider threats
are still not properly addressed by organizations. We contribute to re-
verse this situation by introducing a framework composed of a method
for identification and assessment of insider threat risks and of two sup-
porting deliverables for awareness of insider threat. The deliverables are:
(i) attack strategies structured in four decomposition trees, and (ii) a
matrix which correlates defense strategies, attack strategies and control
principles. The method output consists of goal-based requirements for
the defense against insiders.
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1 Introduction
According to recent surveys [1,2] and reports from studies [3,4] carried out by the
U.S. Secret Services and the CERT (http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/),
insiders are responsible for major financial losses, damages and disruptions to or-
ganizations. Worse, insider attacks are tending to rise and to become comparable
in frequency to security events originated by outsiders. We consider an insider,
as defined by Bishop [5], as “a trusted entity that is given the power to violate
one or more rules in a given security policy... the insider threat occurs when a
trusted entity abuses that power”. The CERT categorizes insider crime in three
major groups: fraud, theft of information and IT sabotage. The first one occurs
when someone obtains unjustifiable services or property from the organization.
The second one occurs when someone steals confidential or proprietary informa-
tion from the organization. The third one occurs when someone harms, in any
sense, the organization or individual(s) within the organization. Among these
groups they found: (i) there is no conclusive evidence that a general profile of
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insiders exists, and (ii) in more than half of the cases studied, insiders exploited
vulnerabilities in applications, processes and procedures/policies, not necessarily
known by outsiders. Thus, insiders do not only take advantage of technical ex-
pertise but they also take advantage of details specific to the organization and of
social engineering in an environment based on trust. Additionally, insiders tend
to have more opportunities, when compared to outsiders, caused e.g. by the de-
terioration of access and permission management which may cause accumulation
of privileges. In summary, the combination of power, trust and knowledge turn
insiders particularly dangerous and, as a consequence, their malicious actions
have high probability to be successful and to remain undetected.
To reduce the insider threat problem, many challenges have yet to be over-
come. One challenge is the identification and assessment of risks that insiders
represent to an organization. This awareness of risks allows planning of detection
and prevention countermeasures. Another challenge is the modeling and analysis
of the insider threat in a practical way, as e.g. step-wise or detailed approaches
like attack trees [6], misuse cases [7] and defense trees [8] may become unusable
due to the wide spectrum of insiders’ goals. Yet another challenge is the lack of
tool support for insider threat identification and assessment.
The contribution of this paper is a framework that addresses the first two
challenges mentioned above. It consists of a method for identification and as-
sessment of insider threat risks, and of two deliverables. The deliverables are:
(i) insider attack strategies structured in four decomposition trees, and (ii) a
matrix that relates control principles to attack and defense strategies. The pur-
pose of these two deliverables is to increase awareness about the insider problem
in general for a more efficient and effective application of the method in an or-
ganizational context. They take the perspective of control principles, which are
exploited by attack strategies and enforced by defense strategies. This perspec-
tive enables us to look at the insider problem as a whole and gather requirements
against all insiders categories, i.e. fraud, theft of information and IT sabotage.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly (i) introduces the notion
of control principles, (ii) organizes insiders attack strategies in four decomposi-
tion trees, (iii) presents a matrix for matching defense strategies, attack strategies
and control principles, and (iv) introduces the actual method, core of the frame-
work. Section 3 describes an example application of the framework. In Section 4
the framework is discussed, in Sections 5 related work is reviewed, and finally,
in Section 6, we conclude and point to future work.
2 A framework for gathering defense requirements
The proposed framework is composed of a method and of supporting deliverables.
Its goal is to help organizations to identify requirements that enable defense
against insiders.
Control principles are our starting point and this choice is twofold. First,
insiders exploit vulnerabilities which can be achieved by exploiting control prin-
ciples. Second, control principles provide mechanisms for organizations to pre-
vent and detect insiders activities. Thus, control principles are, on the one hand,
exploited by attack strategies, due to flaws or weaknesses in processes, applica-
tions, infrastructure, etc, and, on the other hand, enforced by defense strategies
to assure a certain level of security.
Cobit [9] defines controls as “the policies, procedures, practices and organi-
zational structures designed to provide reasonable assurance that business ob-
jectives will be achieved and undesired events will be prevented or detected and
corrected.” Although each organization implements specific controls according
to their goal(s)/business mission they are based on common control principles
which apply to any organization.
The most relevant controls for this paper are: (i) Separation of Duties (SoD),
(ii) Dual Control, (iii) Delegation and Revocation, (iv) Audit, (v) Least Privilege,
(vi) Non-repudiation, (vii) Reconciliation, and (viii) Classification of Assets.
Refer to our technical report [10] for a taxonomy of control principles.
2.1 Supporting deliverable: attack strategies decomposition trees
We structure attack strategies exploited by insiders in four attack strategy de-
composition trees using two sources: literature [3,4,11] and our taxonomy of
control principles [10]. Due to lack of space, we are only able to show in this
paper the tree “Abuse permission”, in Figure 1. The other trees (“Pre-attack”,
“Gain access”, and “Abuse access”) can be found in our report [10].
Decomposition trees permit the breakdown of a tree root and sub-nodes, in
terms of AND/OR relations (in this paper, only OR relations are used in the
decomposition trees). This kind of tree provides a structured way for the analysis
of alternatives and has been used for goal-oriented analysis of requirements [12].
Towards its root, the tree allows for the abstraction of alternatives and, towards
its leaves, the tree allows for precision of alternatives. The main idea of these
trees is to provide a wide spectrum of strategies used by insiders to launch
attacks.
Decomposition trees extend the idea of attack trees (introduced by Schneier [6]).
Attack trees permit the modeling of security threats represented as the root of
the tree. This threat is successively refined through AND and OR joints, indi-
cating conjunction and disjunction between pairs of nodes for the achievement
of their parent node. Thus, attack trees allow the exploration of deepness while
decomposition trees allow the exploration of broadness.
2.2 Supporting deliverable: a matrix of attack versus defense
strategies
A concise version of defense strategies, extracted from a more complete list
available in our report [10], is organized in a matrix with the attack strategies.
Table 1 shows an extract (the full matrix has 15 columns and 17 rows) of such
a matrix, where (i) the horizontal axis contains a list of defense strategies, (ii)
the vertical axis contains the first level of nodes from the attack decomposition
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Fig. 1. Attack strategies involved with “Abuse permission”
Table 1. Extract from a matrix which correlates attack strategies, defense strate-
gies and control principles
trees (where e.g. PA refers to “Pre-attack”, GA to “Gain access” and so on),
and (iii) the intersections provide insights on which control principles can be
used to mitigate the threat of the attack strategy and strength the protection
of the defense strategy. Defense strategies, derived from the literature [3,4,11]
and from control principles, have been composed with the same objective of
broadness instead of deepness as we did for the attack strategies. This matrix
is an example and needs to be customized by organizations according to the
controls they use. Furthermore, it can be refined to a more concrete level by
replacing a control by tools, policies and procedures that implement that control.
If kept up-to-date, this matrix can provide insights about weaknesses in controls
applied to some defenses against attack strategies. Thus, the matrix is useful
when deriving requirements for the defense against insiders.
2.3 Method for gathering defense requirements
The method, shown in IDEF0 notation in Figure 2, consists of 5 steps. The
boxes represent steps of the method. Horizontal arrows coming into the boxes
are inputs which are transformed by the steps into outputs and vertical arrows
are inputs not transformed by the steps. Outputs are represented by horizontal
arrows coming out of the boxes. Due to space constraints it is not possible to
describe the steps of the method in this paper. Refer to our report [10] for details.
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Fig. 2. Method for gathering requirements for defense against insiders
3 The framework applied: an example
Figure 3 shows an example, collected from Chinchani et al. [13], based on a
fictitious financial institution. In the example, a teller can complete any per-
sonal account transaction involving up to $5,000, through the personal account
database, but only a manager can complete transactions, above this limit. Trans-
actions on business accounts are limited to managers upon the presentation of
credentials to a PKI server. Successful authentication generates a session key to
access the business account database. Both databases are protected by firewalls
to prevent external attacks.
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Fig. 3. Example from a fictitious financial institution(from Chinchani et al. [13])
3.1 Example - step 1
A standard business mission for financial institutions is usually in the line of
“provide high quality banking services & financial solutions”. Thus, it implies
on the high criticality of assets and processes related to monetary transactions. In
step 1, management identifies the critical assets/processes. In this very simple
example, we assume that this results in the following list: (i) asset: personal
account database, (ii) process: endorsement of personal account transactions
over $5,000, (iii) asset: business account database, and (iv) process: business
account transactions.
3.2 Example - step 2
We select the process “business account transactions” because, although this
process seems already well protected, the board of directors wants re-assurance.
3.3 Example - step 3 and 4
We simulate the role of stakeholders to identify risks using as reference the four
attack strategy trees. They look at each branch of the trees and decide if the risk
reported is relevant for the process or if it suggests another relevant situation
(i.e. sequence of steps). Table 2 shows the risks identified and assessed.
Risk Defense
level
Risk
level
R1 terminated manager uses his account/credentials after his
termination to perform fraudulent business transactions
high low
R2 terminated manager uses a backdoor account and his “old”
credentials to perform business transactions
low high
R3 insider gains physical access to a manager’s authenticated
computer and performs business transactions
high low
R4 teller learns a vulnerability specific to the organization, e.g.
the manager does not apply security patches on a regular
basis, to acquire credentials to perform business transactions
low high
R5 manager deploys a logic/time bomb in the business account
database
low high
R6 manager performs fraudulent business transactions applied
to, e.g., wife or boyfriend accounts (as beneficiaries)
high low
R7 insider discloses information about business transactions to
competitors or press
low high
R8 member of application X developers team inserts a trap door
in the application code which enables business transactions
low high
R9 manager shares password/credentials with a teller or another
manager (e.g. in case of emergency), enabling them to im-
personate the manager to perform business transactions
high low
Table 2. Risks for the critical process “business account transactions”
3.4 Example - step 5
In this step we identify the defense strategies which seem appropriate as coun-
termeasures for the five risks marked in bold in Table 2. In a real situation, the
defense strategies need to be adapted and refined. Table 3 contains the output of
the method, i.e. goal-based requirements for defense against the organizations’
insiders.
This example demonstrates the potential applicability of the framework for
the identification of insider risks and corresponding defenses. We have seen that
the process analyzed, which seemed already well protected, is in fact subject to
risks which might not be evident.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the proposed framework around three topics which,
we believe, turn it interesting: (i) merging of access-oriented with permission-
oriented approaches, (ii) abstraction from attacker goals and focus on attacker
means, and (iii) shift from risk-based to defense-based assessment of insider
threat risks.
The management of access control may deteriorate over time, opening secu-
rity breaches for abuse from insiders. These breaches are related not only to the
Defense goal
D1 review all access paths to assets periodically to ensure actual paths match
expected paths
D2 ensure security patches are applied in a regular basis on every node of the
inner network area
D3 adopt inventory and configuration management to audit if hardware and
software installed in desktops and servers comply with expected
D4 analyze audit logs to track critical transactions and to track access, modi-
fication and deletion of critical information
D5 inspect code (e.g. via peer review)
D6 support security policies by education, i.e. organization-wide security
awareness and training initiatives for potential insiders
Table 3. Defense goals for the critical process “business account transactions”
authorization of access to assets but also to more subtle permissions and control
principles, such as prohibition of access, delegation of authorization, separation
of duties, membership to roles, etc. In the case of insiders, it is important to
consider all these aspects when assessing risks.
Our approach to the modeling of insider threat concentrates not on the goals
of an insider but on the spectrum of alternatives he can exploit to reach these
goals. The decomposition trees (“Pre-attack”, “Gain access”, “Abuse access”
and “Abuse permission”) we propose reflect this approach of focus on means,
allowing the combination of these means in countless ways to reach whatever
goals. Other researchers (e.g. [11,14]) have modeled insider threat differently.
The most used approach to prioritize risks related to attacks rely on measures
of attack likelihood or impact. However, it is difficult to determine probability
measures for the likelihood of an insider attack in a meaningful way. It is also
difficult to evaluate the impact of an insider attack since it depends on the insider
intents and goals. We prioritize risks represented by insiders using the level of
defense of the asset/process under analysis for a specific risk. This shift allows
the classification of a same risk differently according to the level of defense or
degree of resistance of the asset/process under this risk.
The deliverables of our framework aim to decrease the dependency on expert
judgment for the assessment of insiders risks. We believe that stakeholders can
participate more effectively and efficiently in the process of identification and as-
sessment of risks if they have knowledge about means exploitable by insiders and
defenses useful against them. However, we are aware of the subjectivity implied
in the assessment of the defense level of an asset/process in our framework.
5 Related work
The framework presented in this paper is related to insider threat modeling
and risk management, the main ingredients of our approach. With respect to
the latter, we review briefly two risk management frameworks, OCTAVE [15]
and NIST SP 800-30 [16], as well as risk assessment patterns [17], considered of
relevance for our work. With respect to the former, we already reviewed, along
the paper, relevant related work [7,8,11,14,6].
Three points from OCTAVE are of interest for our work: (i) threats are gath-
ered from enterprise knowledge. We believe our deliverables decrease this depen-
dence; (ii) assets are prioritized based on threats, opposed to our approach where
prioritization is aligned to organization goal(s)/business mission; (iii) vulnerabil-
ities are identified based on catalogs of known attacks, however threats related
to “accumulation of privileges” (AP-13) e.g. are hardly found in catalogs.
Two points from the NIST SP 800-30 standard are worth emphasizing in
respect to our work: (i) threats are derived from threat-sources. Thus, in terms
of insiders, the focus would be on human threats. We believe our approach of
attack strategies induces a broader vision of the insider problem, since it provides
insights not commonly explored, as for example, separation of duty scenarios,
which are unlikely to be considered in threat-source reasoning; (ii) vulnerabilities
and controls have to be analyzed. We have a more focused approach when we
evaluate defense level for one specific threat, indirectly combining the two.
Risk assessment patterns provide the basics of the method proposed in this
paper. However, two points are worth mentioning. First, the proposed framework
applies the general pattern specifically to the Insider Threat domain, by means of
supporting deliverables. Thus, it adds value to the patters in that sense. Second,
it fills some gaps left to the implementer of the risk assessment pattern. For
example, we define a simple rationale for the qualitative prioritization of risks
based on the protection level in place for an asset/process.
6 Conclusion
We address the assessment of risks represented by insiders by proposing a frame-
work that consists of (i) a method for gathering goal-based requirements for
defense against insiders, and of (ii) two deliverables: insider attack strategies or-
ganized in four decomposition trees, and a matrix structure for matching attack
and defense strategies with control principles. We do not claim that the method
itself is specific for insiders and not applicable to outsiders threat. However, the
framework as a whole is tailored to provide awareness to organizations towards
e.g. abuse of permissions related to SoD and accumulation of roles, specific to
insiders.
As a short-term plan we aim to validate and calibrate the framework through
action research. As a long-term plan we aim to develop tools e.g. for the eval-
uation of the defense level of an asset, to make the process of defense level
assessment of our framework more sistematic.
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